Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
深圳经济特区除“四害”管理办法
广东省深圳市政府
深圳经济特区除“四害”管理办法
1994年1月29日深圳市人民政府令第21号发布
第一章 总 则
第一条 为建设社会主义精神文明，改善投资环境，保障人民身体健康，根据国家有关法规，特制定本办法。
第二条 消灭苍蝇、蚊子、老鼠、蟑螂（以下简称除“四害”）是全体市民的共同任务，深圳经济特区范围内一切单位（包括外驻、内联企业以及外商投资企业）和个人均应遵守本办法。
第三条 深圳市爱国卫生运动委员会（以下简称“市爱卫会”）是执行本办法的主管机关，市爱国卫生运动委员会办公室（以下简称“市爱卫办”）具体负责组织本办法的实施。
第四条 除“四害”所需经费由各单位和住户自行解决，公共无主用地由各级政府负责承担。
第五条 卫生、教育、文化、宣传部门及各社会团体，有义务促进除“四害”工作的实施，并积极宣传和普及除“四害”知识，提高全市人民的卫生素质。
第二章 措施与要求
第六条 除“四害”工作贯彻“治本为主，标本兼治”和专业队伍与群众运动相结合的原则，对易孳生或易招致四害的行业和场所，要有专管人员、专管制度和完善的防范杀灭措施。
第七条 各单位和全体市民都有参与除“四害”工作的义务，要服从爱卫办和卫生防疫部门人员的指导、监督和检查，保护除“四害”的药物器械和监测工具。
第八条 除“四害”药物由市爱卫办、卫生防疫部门及国家允许的单位加工、经营。市爱卫办有权对加工、经营除“四害”药物的单位进行检查，并提出处理意见。
第九条 各区、各单位和各住户应严格控制管辖范围内的蚊虫孳生场所，彻底整治蚊虫孳生地，并运用生物、物理、化学等方法消灭幼虫和成蚊，积水中不得孳生三龄以上的蚊幼虫和蛹。
第十条 各区、各单位和各住户应有防鼠、灭鼠措施，对食品、饮食、仓库等特殊行业应有防鼠设施；应采取堵洞、器械捕捉、毒杀等办法消灭老鼠，任何单位和场所都要达到国家灭鼠先进的要求标准（粉迹法5％以下，鼠夹法1％以下）。
第十一条 各区、各单位和各住户应按市有关规定，确保辖区范围内不孳生苍蝇。加强垃圾、粪便和死禽畜的处理，严禁随地倾倒、堆放，对易招致和孳生苍蝇的行业和地方，应落实防蝇、灭蝇措施，严格控制苍蝇孳生，应采取诱捕、拍打和毒杀等方法消灭成蝇。宾馆、旅店、酒楼、
餐厅及食品生产、加工、储藏、运输、销售行业要达到无蝇的要求。
第十二条 各区、各单位和各住户应积极运用各种方法杀灭蟑螂。
第三章 组织与管理
第十三条 除“四害”组织工作实行“以块为主、条块结合、单位负责”的原则。各区、街道办（镇）、居委会要切实负责做好本辖区范围内除“四害”的组织、领导、监督、检查工作。各单位均应服从辖区的领导，确保本单位红线范围内除“四害”工作达到规定的指标。
第十四条 道路、下水管道、电缆沟、绿化带、公厕、垃圾转运站、垃圾处理厂（场），污水处理厂（场）等除“四害”工作由各管理单位负责。建筑工地和临时住宅的除“四害”工作，由施工队和居住宅使用人员负责，停建工地由所属单位负责。
第十五条 各区、街道办（镇）要切实加强管理与监督，可建立企业性专业化消杀机构，实行有偿服务，承担辖区内除四害研究、试验和消杀任务，使除“四害”工作逐步过渡到专业化、经常化。
第十六条 凡申报成立企业性除“四害”机构（公司）或增加此类经营项目，先由市爱卫办审查其资格，经市有关部门按规定办理有关手续后方可营业。
第十七条 除“四害”的组织发动、宣传教育、资金筹集、效果评定和各种消杀队伍的协调、监督、考查工作，由各级爱卫办负责。
第十八条 各单位、各住户和公共场所的除“四害”工作，可由市、区、街（镇）专业消杀队伍（或公司）承包。专业承包队伍（或公司）应确保承包质量，服从市、区、爱卫办的检查管理和监测考核。未达到本办法规定的指标的，按本办法处罚，连续三次检查不合格者，由市爱卫办
取消其承包资格，市爱卫办认为有必要的，可以提请工商部门吊销其营业执照。
第十九条 除“四害”收费标准由市爱卫办会同物价部门确定公布。
第四章 奖励和处罚
第二十条 各级爱卫办要分期开展除“四害”的检查评比工作。对在除“四害”工作中做出显著成绩的单位和个人，各级政府要给予表扬和奖励。对不重视做好这项工作，经检查不合格的单位和个人，可视情节轻重，由市、区爱卫办分别给予批评教育、通报、罚款等处理，情节特别严
重的，可会同有关部门作出停业整顿的处理。
第二十一条 除“四害”的监督、检查、处罚工作由各级爱卫办实施。
第二十二条 凡在各单位管辖范围内发现有下列情况者，按下列规定给予处罚。
（一）在辖区范围内发现积水孳生三龄以上孑孓者，每平方米（不足一平方米的按一平方米计）罚款100元。
（二）在辖区范围内发现垃圾没有容器盛装，化粪池没有加盖或破损，孳生地有三龄蝇幼虫或蛹，每平方米（不足一平方米的按一平方米计）罚款100元。
（三）经营、供应直接食用的食品有蝇接触或厨房、食品加工场，装有空调的客房或餐厅内有苍蝇，每只罚款50元。
（四）在辖区范围内发现有新鲜鼠洞或新鲜鼠屎，经测定鼠密度超过规定指标的，除要求采取必要措施外，罚款100元至1000元。
第二十三条 已雇请专业消杀队伍（或公司）承包的单位，如有本办法第二十二条规定情况的，罚款由承包者承担。
第二十四条 故意损坏除“四害”药物、器械者，照价赔偿并处50元至500元罚款。
第二十五条 未经批准经营除“四害”药物或伪劣药物者，由市爱卫办会同市工商部门、技术监督部门，没收其全部药物及收入，并视情节及危害程度依法处理。
第二十六条 现场处罚须有两人以上，出具市政府统一印制的行政执法检查证，并使用市财政制发的统一罚款单据。罚款应如数上缴市、区财政局。
第二十七条 被处罚单位和个人对处罚决定不服者，可在接到处罚决定书后的次日起十五天内向上一级爱卫会办公室提出复议申请，上一级爱卫会办公室应在收到复议申请后十五日内作出书面决定。仍不服者可在收到复议决定书十五天内向法院起诉，对在上述期限内未提出复议或起诉
但又不履行处罚决定者，由作出处罚决定的部门申请人民法院强制执行。
第二十八条 除“四害”监督管理机构及其工作人员，必须尽职尽责，依法办事，对玩忽职守、滥用职权、收取贿赂的，由上级主管部门根据情节轻重依法处理。
第五章 附 则
第二十九条 本办法有关用语含义：
（一）孳生地：是指适宜蚊、蝇等虫害繁殖生长的场所，如积水、垃圾堆、粪池等。
（二）粉迹法：指按国家统一规定，在一定的范围内，布放一定数量的粉板，一夜以后，用鼠迹阳性板数所占的比例计算鼠密度的一种测定方法。
（三）鼠夹法：指按国家统一规定，在一定的范围内，布放一定数量的鼠夹，一夜以后，用所夹的鼠数所占的比例计算鼠密度的一种测定方法。
第三十条 本办法自发布之日起实施。
1994年1月29日
